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WHILE WAITING FOR REFORM

By STEPHEN L. SHELDON*
INTRODUCTION
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court held that
claim construction was a matter for the judge rather than the jury. The reasoning
2
was, in relevant part:
[Tihe limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee,
the encouragement of the inventive genius of others and the assurance that
the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public.
Otherwise, a zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation
may enter only at the risk of infringement claims would discourage
invention only a little less than unequivocal foreclosure of the field, and the
public would be deprived of rights supposed to belong to it, without being
clearly told what it is that limits these rights.
While the purpose behind the Supreme Court's holding was laudable, the
expected increase in predictability has not been realized. 3
Given the lack of
predictability, 4 either the Supreme Court misjudged the ability of judges to more
accurately construe claims or improper methodology has been used in the attempt to
carry out the Supreme Court's intent. This Comment assumes that the Supreme
Court correctly assessed the abilities of District Court judges and that the problem
lies in the methodology.
To address the issue of unpredictable claim construction, this comment reviews
the policies behind a patent grant and looks at how claim construction is currently
done. Next, this comment develops criteria and uses the criteria to analyze the
current and suggested methods for claim construction.
Finally, this comment
proposes a change in the methodology that 1) addresses some of the shortcomings of
the existing alternatives and 2) is relatively simple to implement.
* Stephen Sheldon is a third year student at The John Marshall Law School in Chicago.
He has
accepted an associate position at Banner & Witcoff, Ltd. The opinions expressed in this comment
are solely the opinions of the author and should not be attributed to either The John Marshall Law
School or Banner & Witcoff.
1 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996).
2 Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
3 See Cybor Corp. v. Fas Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Rader, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that current handling of the patent claims has resulted in an overturning of
almost 40 percent of claims); Christian Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuits Claim
Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104-05 (2001) (arguing that the reversal rate
of claim construction has increased over time since the decision in Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d 1448).
4 Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1476; Chu, supra note 3, at 1104. Of the 179 cases that involved
expressed claim construction review, the CAFC modified the claim construction 44% of the time.
Chu, supra note 3, at 1104.
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BACKGROUND

A. PatentBasics
A patent gives the inventor or assignee the right to exclude all other from
using, selling or making the invention. 5 The patent, at a basic level, consists of a
subject matter claim and sufficient disclosure to enable one skilled in the art to
practice the invention. 6 To obtain a patent, the invention must be new 7 , novel s and

non-obvious. 9 The right to exclusivity is territorial; the owner of the patent can only
exclude others from using the invention within the United States. 10

The right of

exclusivity is for a limited period of 20 years.11

1. The Purpose Of Patents
A patent serves two basic functions: granting an exclusive right to the
inventor, as previously mentioned, and providing the public with a disclosure
sufficient to allow one skilled in

the art to practice the invention. 1 2

From the

inventor's perspective, the grant of a patent allows and encourages an inventor to
research and discover a widget that is valuable with the hope of a net gain for the

inventor. 13 From a public perspective, the monopoly-like grant of a patent is given
with the expectation that the long-term value of the advancement in the art will

5 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999). The right to exclusivity also relates to processes and
grants the owner the right to prevent products made by the process from being used or sold in the
US. Id.
6 Cf 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (requiring both a written description and the claims, which
together make up the specification).
7 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). The invention can be for "any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement." Id.
8 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994 & Supp. 1999). Section 102 can be logically split into two types of
conditions, a statutory bar and a requirement of novelty. Id.
9 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994). "A patent may not be obtained .. .if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art ... would have been obvious ... to a person
having ordinary skill in the art.
Id.
10 35 U.S.C. § 154.
11 Id.
12 See U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The patent is granted "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
13 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 43 (5th ed. Aspen Law & Business
1998). An individual might spend $50 million to invent a new blender. Id. This research would
only be done if the inventor could expect to make a profit greater than $50 million. Id. Without the
patent protection, there would be no way to exclude other manufactures from making an identical
blender and selling it at a lower cost. Id. The other manufactures would not need to recoup the
investment costs and thus could sell the blender for a lower price and still make a profit, effectively
driving the original inventor out of business. Id. Knowing this, the original inventor would not
spend the money on research that he could not recover. d. Regarding why the blender invention is
an increase in value, it might be more useful to the consumer or it might be cheaper to manufacture,
both scenarios would improve the value of the blender.
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outweigh the dead-weight loss due to the monopoly-like protection a patent gives to
14
its owner.

2. The Importance Of The Patent System To The UnitedStates Economy
The United States economy is the largest in the world. 15 Currently, the United
States imports more than it exports; therefore, the economy of the United States is
important to much of the world.16 Thus, any factor important to the growth of United
States economy needs to be carefully designed so as to ensure there are no
17
unnecessary complications or restrictions to growth.
One important factor to the United States economy is technology. Economist
Robert M. Solow has argued that as much as 90% of the growth in the United States'
GDP is related to technology gains.18 In addition, economist Paul M. Romer has
suggested that research and development is one place where increased investments
do not suffer from diminishing returns. 19 Because patents, at least to some degree,
help promote technology gains, an argument can be made that a well-functioning
20
patent system is important to the United States economy.

14 DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 5 (2d ed. 2001).

The dead weight

loss is the sum of the loss of consumer and producer surplus less the producer surplus gained. Id. at
63-65. If there are sufficient substitutes for a product the monopoly-like protection will provide no
aid to the producer because consumers will purchase substitutes if the price of the good rises above
the market price for that type of good. Id. at 65-66.
15 World Gross Domestic Productat Market Exchange Rates, 1991-2000, ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, available athttp://http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/iea/popgdp.html
(last visited Oct. 14, 2002) (showing that the United States GDP, at nine trillion dollars, is almost
twice the size of Japan's economy and more than three times the size of the German economy). For
a more complete look at the U.S. economy, see Virginia H. Mannering & Kenneth A. Petrick, Gross
Domestic Product:Second Quarter2002 (Final),at
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/newsrel/gdpnewsrelease.htm/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
16 See Final Report of "The U.S. Trade Deficit Causes, Consequences and Recommendations
for Action", at http://www.ustdrc.gov/reports/finalrept-contents.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2001)
(stating that the trade deficit in the year 2000 was about 450 billion dollars).
17 C£ Alan Greenspan, Economy and Change Investingin an EducatedFuture,
STUDYOVERSEAS.COM (Oct. 14, 2002), at http://www.studyoverseas.com/business/greenspna.htm
(suggesting that the bulk of the recent increases in GDP represents insights into how to transform
raw materials into finished goods and that the education system is crucial to promoting future
improvements in technology). Just like education is crucial to discover the advances, patents are
crucial to encouraging companies to invest in research with a hope of return.
18 Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,39 REV. ECON.
& STAT. 312, 320 (1957). The article introduced a way to separate the variations in output per head
between technology and capital investment. Id. at 312. This separation allows one to look at the
how technology increases have impacted the United States economy.
19 Paul M. Romer, IncreasingReturn and Long-Run Growth, 94 J. POL. ECON. 1002 (1986).
Assuming "forward-looking, profit-maximzing agents", the long-run growth is driven primarily by
accumulation of knowledge. Id. at 1003. More importantly, knowledge exhibits increasing rates of
return, and therefore there is no optimal level of technology. Id. This means that increasing levels
of knowledge bring increasing levels of productivity, no matter how much knowledge already exists.
20 See Robert P. Merges, Uncertaintyand the StandardofPatentabity,7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1,
8 (Spring 1992) (arguing that many of the critiques of the patent system are out of date because the
patent system was significantly strengthened with the creation of the Federal Circuit). The value of
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If the importance of patents is accepted, the need for a well-functioning patent
system is obvious. While it is not clear where the ideal patent system would draw
lines regarding the level of protection and the level of advancement to the art,2 1 it is
possible to say what an ideal system should not look like. 22 An ideal patent system
would not allow vague claims that make it difficult to determine the scope of the
claims, 23 it would not grant excessive gains to either the public or the patentee, 24 and
it would not have excessive transactional costs. 25 More specifically, a properly

functioning patent system would provide certainty to the patent holder and to the
26
public regarding the right to exclude.
Certainty is important to an inventor because a patent is only worthwhile if the
right to exclude has a value greater than the cost to enforce that right.27 Therefore,
to encourage research, it makes sense to make the costs of the patent as clear as
possible. 28 To ensure that the value of the patent is maximized requires that the
patent first be valid, for any attempt to enforce the patent right against other
patent damage awards has significantly increased since the creation of the Federal Circuit, thus
suggesting that patents have become more valuable. Id.
21 See generally George M. Sirilla, Hon. Giles S. Rich, 35 U.S.C. § 103: From Hotchkiss to
Hand to Rich, The Obvious Patent Law Hallof-Famers,32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437 (Spring 1999)
(tracing development of obviousness factor and how the strength of patents has changed through out
the years). Because of the difficulty in determining just how strong the patent protection should be
or just how difficult it should be to receive a patent, the task is best left to future historians, perhaps
they may find it possible to determine where the line should have been drawn.
22 See generally35 U.S.C. (laying out patent requirements).
23 Cf 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring detailed enough specification so the patent is enabling and
gives notice).
24 See CHISUM, supra note 14, at 5 (explaining that dead-weight loss is a result of monopolistic
protection given to patent holder); see also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262
(1979) (holding that patents are a balance of reward for the inventor and knowledge for the public);
Merges, supra note 20, at 18-19 (arguing that the purpose of a patent enablement doctrine is to
ensure the property grant to the inventor is appropriate in light of the knowledge contribution to the
inventor's field of research).
25 Cf Mark Zandi, The Why(s) of This Expansion, Part I THE DISMAL SCIENTIST (Feb. 3,
2000), at http://www.dismal.com/dismal/dsp/article.asp?aid=501 (arguing that part of the reason for
the strength of the economy is the increased power of computers and the lower cost of doing business
as a result) (last visited Oct. 14, 2001) (subscription required).
26 See Paul R. Michel, A Review of Recent Decisions of UnitedStates Court of Appeals for the
FederalCircuit, 48 AM. U.L. REV. 1177, 1191 (1999) (arguing that a serious problem exists with the
current patent system if seasoned practitioners are unable to predict the outcome based on a given
set of facts).
27 See CHISUM, supra note 14, at 73. The value of a patent could be obtained through license
agreements, manufacturing a desirable product or simply selling the patent. Id. The cost of the
patent can include the cost to invent, the cost of actually obtaining the patent and the cost to enforce
the patent. See genorally id. at 66-76. In addition, an inventor has to evaluate the risk that a
superior invention will be discovered, reducing the value of the inventor's patent or that someone
will be able to design around the patent. Id. at 75.
28 See Merges, supranote 20, at 18-20 (arguing that firms might well try to patent riskier, i.e.
more difficult to prefect, inventions if the rewards were known to be higher, thus compensating for
the increased risk). Unfortunately, the cost of a patent can be quite high, for in addition to the
attorney fees and the filing fees and maintenance fees there are the litigation fees. Samson
Vermont, The Economics of PatentLitigation, Part1, available at
http://www.hunton.com/pdfs/article/Risk Reward.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2002); see also,AMERICAN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 1999, at 72 (showing
that in California the typical cost of a patent infringement case is almost 2.5 million dollars).
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individuals may result in a counter-claim that the patent is invalid.2 9 Assuming the
patent is valid30 , the real question then becomes whether the patent has been
infringed. 31 If infringement were clear, then the infringer would want to settle out of
court because the cost of litigation would be added to the inevitable cost of infringing
that would be charged to the infringer. 32 Unfortunately, infringement is not always
clear because what the patent covers is sometimes ambiguous and it is possible,
while not literally infringing the patent, to infringe the patent under the doctrine of
33
equivalents.

3. The Function Of Patent Claims.
An important factor in determining the patent holder's right to exclude is the
35
patent claim. 3 4 The claim gives the public fair notice as to what is being claimed.
The claim covers a product or a process but not a function or result or scientific
explanation of the operation.36 The claim defines the right to exclude both things
that are perfect copies of the invention and things that reach "the heart of the

29 See, e.g., Amtel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999); GeorgiaPacific Corp. v. United States Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Another common tactic
is for a potential patent infringer to sue seeking a declaratory judgment that the patent is invalid or
not infringed. E.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. Astro-Valcour, Inc., 267 F.3d 1334, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
Vivid Technologies, Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
30 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (presuming that a patent is valid); Robotic Vision
Sys. v. View Eng'", Inc., 189 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that, given the strong
presumption that a patent is valid, an invalidity claim must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence). To ensure that the value of the patent is maximized requires that the patent first be
valid, for any attempt to enforce the patent right against other individuals may result in a counterclaim that the patent is invalid. E.g., Amtel Corp., 198 F.3d at 1376; Georgia-PacificCorp., 195 F.3d
at 1326.
31 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (granting the right to exclude other from practicing the invention).
Logically, if the accused device does not infringe (or practice) the invention then the patent owner
has no right to control the accused device.
32 Cf Merges, supra note 20, at 43-44 (arguing that a risk-adverse person would demand a
higher reward if the outcome was less certain).
The analogy relates to infringement in a
straightforward manner, if chance of a showing infringement approaches zero than a risk-adverse
person would not spend money in an attempt to show infringement.
33 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 37374 (holding that patents also protect against products that
"go to the heart of the invention"); but see Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoko Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
Ltd., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (vacating and remanding but holding that doctrine of equivalents is not
available for a particular limitation if the scope of the limitation was narrowed and the limitation
originally covered the alleged equivalent). When Festo is combined with the recent decision in
Johnson & Johnston Associates Inc., v. R.E. Service Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002), there is
not much left to the doctrine of equivalents.
34 Markman, 517 U.S. at 373. The patent must have one or more claims that "particularly
point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." Id.
(citing 35 U.S.C. § 112).
35 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring the specification to set forth a claim with supporting
disclosure); Markman, 517 U.S. at 373 (holding that one side of the bargain for a patent is a public
disclosure so that other inventors will know what is still available); Merges, supra note 20, at 18-19.
36 Markman, 517 U.S. at 373; see also, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (listing what types of inventions or
discoveries can be patented).
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invention but avoid the literal language... by making a noncritical change." 37
Typically, patent lawsuits charge that the defendant made, used, or sold the
invention without permission of the patent owner (i.e. the accused device or process
is infringing on the patentee's exclusive right to the invention).38 The determination
of infringement requires the court 1) to construe what the patent claims mean and 2)
39
to determine if the construed claim covers the alleged infringing device or process.

B. The Effect of Markman On Claim Construction
Markman 140 and Markman ff41 had no real effect on the logical analysis of
infringement, first the claims are construed and then the construed claims are
compared to the accused device to determine if there is infringement. 42 Before
Markman, the issue of claim construction was sometimes considered to be a question
of fact and sometimes considered to be a question of law. 43 Either the judge or the
jury was free to decide the issue of claim construction, depending on whether it was a
44
bench or jury trial.
1. The Markman Holdings45
While Markman went to the Supreme Court, both Markman I and Markman
If have holdings that are noteworthy. 46 Markman started in the Eastern District
37 Markman, 517 U.S. at 373. But see supra, note 33 (suggesting that insubstantial changes
may well escape infringement under the current doctrine of equivalents framework).
38 Markman, 517 U.S. at 374. Sometime a potential infringer will initiate the lawsuit against
the patent holder, a common tactic is for the potential patent infringer to sue seeking a declaratory
judgment that the patent is invalid or not infringed. E.g., Dow-Chemical Co., 267 F.3d at 1336-37;
Vivid Technologies, Inc., 200 F.3d at 799.
39 Vivid Technologies, Inc., 200 F.3d at 803; Markman, 52 F.3d at 976; Hormone Research
Found, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
40 Markman, 52 F.3d 967.
41 Markman, 517 U.S. 370.
42 Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1466 (Mayer, J., concurring).
43 See Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellsehaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546,
1550-52 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that claim construction can be a factual question); Palumbo v.
Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that the meaning of a claim, when disputed,
is a factual question and can be submitted to the jury or the judge). In fact, a significant line of
cases existed stating that claim construction could be a question of fact. Markman, 52 F.3d. at 977
(citing cases). Somewhat confusingly, a second line of cases held that claim construction was a
question of law. Id. (citing cases). While the Federal Circuit has apparently been inconsistent, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that claim construction is a question of law. Hogg v. Emerson,
47 U.S. (6 How.) 437, 484 (1848); Silsby v. Foote, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 218, 225 (1853); Singer Mfg. Co.
v. Cramer, 192 U.S. 265, 275 (1904).
44 Palumbo,762 F.2d at 974.
45 In this note, the term "Markman" refers to both the Supreme Court and the CAFC decision
collectively. Markman I and Markman II will used to refer to the CAFC decision and Supreme
Court decision, respectively, where there is a need to differentiate between the two cases.
46 See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1451 (holding that because the Supreme Court affirmed the
CAFC in Markman II, the CAFC's holding in Markman I that claim construction is review do novo
was fully supported).
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Court of Pennsylvania, there the District Court granted judgment as a matter of law
("JMOL") because the court found that claims one and ten were not infringed as a
matter of law. 47 In Markman ,an en bane Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
("CAFC") affirmed the decision and held that claim construction was a legal question
to be resolved by the court. 48 The CAFC also held that the claim construction would
be reviewed de novo on appeal. 49 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari 50 and affirmed the judgment of the CAFC.51 The Supreme Court held that
claim interpretation was better left in the hands of a judge because the judge, when
52
compared to a jury, was better suited to interpret complex patent language.

2. The Affect OfMarkman On PatentLitigation
Since the holding in Markman, the District Courts have held what are known as
"Markman hearings." 53 The hearings typically take place after a substantial portion
of the discovery process has occurred. 54 In the hearing the patent claims are
construed by the District Court judge. 55 After the Markman hearing, both parties
have the claim construction and then attempt to win on the infringement
determination portion of the trial. 56 Both sides know, however, that the claim
57
construction is reviewed de novo by the CAFC.

47 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F.Supp. 1535, 1536 (E.D. Penn. 1991).
48 Ma±rkman,52 F.3d at 970-71.
49 Markman, 52 F.3d at 975.
50 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 515 U.S. 1192 (1995).
51 Ma±rkman,517 U.S. at 391.
52 Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-91. First, a judge in general is better suited to interpreting
complex written instruments. Id. at 388. Therefore, a judge is more likely to correctly construe a
technical patent claim. -d. at 388-89. Second, while a jury is good at deciding questions of
credibility of expert testimony, most cases will not rest on expert testimony. Id. Third and finally,
the importance of conformity indicates that judges should construe the claims because issue
preclusion will promote "intrajurisdictional uniformity." d.at 390-91.
53 See, e.g., Ethicon Endo Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 1577
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing how the District Court, after the Markman I decision, decided to hold a
Markman hearing and interpret the claims).

54 See William F. Lee & Anita K. Krug, Still Adjusting To Markman: A PrescriptionFor The
Timing Of Claim Construction Hearings, 13 HARV. J. LAW & TEc 55 (1999) (arguing that the most
appropriate time for a "Markman hearing" is after the needed discovery has been completed but
before the trial starts).
55 See Ethicon, 93 F.3d at 1577 (reviewing District Court's decision). The District Court judge
held a five-day hearing. Id. At the close of the hearing the judge construed the claims. Id. He
determined that claims 6 and 24, in light of the prosecution history, had to be read narrowly and
therefore United States Surgical Corp. did not literally infringe claims 6 or 24. Id.
56 Ethieon, 93 F.3d at 1577. In Ethkcon, after narrowly construing the claims, the court
granted JMOL on the issue of literal infringement and also granted JMOL on the issue of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, effectively ending the case. Id.
57 Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1454. The trial court looks at the actual wording of the patent
claim and the prosecution history. Id. The trial court then, using extrinsic evidence where helpful,
resolves what the claim means as a matter of law. -d. The trial court's construction, enlightened
though it may be by extrinsic evidence, is still just a decision of law and is subject to de novo review.

Id.

[2:138 2002]

A Practical Solution to Claim Construction

The Markman hearing itself has several steps, for construing a complex patent
claim is not a simple thing.58 First, the judge examines the patent claim language in
an attempt to determine the plain meaning. 59 Second, the judge compares the plain
meaning of the claim to the written description and the prosecution history, for the
proper meaning will make sense in light of the written description and the
prosecution history. 60 Third, judges while construing the claim may take into
account extrinsic evidence like "customs and usage in the relevant art," the "level of
ordinary skill in the art," and numerous other factual components during the claim
constructing process.6 1 After considering all the relevant evidence, the judge
62
determines the proper claim construction and the case continues.

C The Markman Problem And ProposedSolutions
The problem with the current rule of law regarding infringement rests with
how the claim construction is reviewed on appeal.6 3 The District Court construes the
claims of the patent to determine the scope of the patent grant. 64 Claim construction
is purely a legal matter, however, and the CAFC is free to modify the claim
construction on appeal because the review is de novo. 65 As the Supreme Court
stated, having the CAFC review claim construction does arguably promote
consistency in how claims are construed because there is only one circuit court

58 Cf Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 (holding that, given the difficulty of interpreting patent
claims, judges will construe claims rather then juries because judges are better suited to complex
claim interpretation).
59 Vivid, 200 F.3d at 804 (citing Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 810 F.2d 1113, 1116
(Fed. Cir. 1987)); Ethicon, 93 F.3d at 1577; Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. "First, we look to the words of
the claims themselves, both asserted and nonasserted, to define the scope of the patented invention."
90 F.3d at 1582. Words are given their normal meaning unless the patentee uses the words in a
different manner and the patentee makes the special definitions clear in the specification. Id.
60 Vivid, 200 F.3d at 804; Ethicon, 93 F.3d at 1577; Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. In Vitronics,
the plaintiff appealed the claim construction of the District Court. 90 F.3d at 1578. The CAFC held
that the plaintiffs requested construction was correct, in light of the prosecution history. Id.
61 Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1477-78 (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that more deference
should be given to the District Court judge's claim construction because of all the extrinsic evidence
available to the trial judge).
62 Cf Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1580 (noting that sometimes the way a court construes the patent
claim can be dispositive on the issue of infringement); Vivid, 200 F.3d at 803 (holding that claim
construction is well recognized to "resolve some or all of the issues of infringement").
63 The overall approach to determining infringement is well settled and not in dispute. E.g.
Markman, 517 U.S. at 384; Markman, 52 F.3d at 976; SSIH Equipment S.A. v. United States Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 376 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
64 Ethicon, 93 F.3d at 1577.
65 Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1451; soo also Vivid, 200 F.3d at 799 (affirming the District Court's
claim construction because, based on the specifications and prosecution history, the CAFC construed
the claim the same way); Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1578 (reversing the District Court's claim
construction based on the patent's specification). In Vitronics, the District Court appeared to
construe the claims based on expert evidence. 90 F.3d at 1581. The CAFC reversed, holding that in
most cases the intrinsic evidence will be enough to resolve any ambiguity and that in this case the
District Court improperly considered expert evidence contrary to the patent specification. Id. at
1583-84.
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reviewing all claim construction. 66 The flip side to the consistency of claim
construction is that until the CAFC rules on claim construction no one really knows
how the claims will be construed. 67 Thus, while it is arguably important to get a
favorable claim construction during a trial, 68 the construction that counts is the
69
construction that the CAFC determines to be accurate.
This de novo review tends to delay early settlement of cases, thus increasing the
transactional costs. 70 Often, as parties are only likely to try close cases, until the
claim construction is determined by the CAFC there is little reason to settle.71 In
addition, the parties have already spent most of the cost associated with litigation by
the time the claims are construed so there is often no significant financial reason not
to appeal to the CAFC.7

2

Several ideas have been suggested to solve the dilemmas of uncertain claim
construction. One of the most obvious and easiest to implement would be to give

66 Markman, 517 U.S. at 391. Logically, given the small number of judges on the CAFC, one
would expect an increase in consistency as compared to relying on a much larger number of District
Court judges or even the various other circuit courts.
67 Cf Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1473 (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that de novo review of
claim construction improperly removes the decision making process from trial, contrary to the
Supreme Court direction in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977) that suggests the trial
should be the main event); see also Michel, supra note 26, at 1191 (arguing that until the claims
have been construed by a the CAFC the trial results "will not be seen as acceptable").
68 Cf Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1476, n. 16 (citing a survey of patent decision that indicated
the CAFC reversed, in whole or in part, about 38% of the District Court's claim construction).
Because the reversal rate is lower than 50% there is some advantage in having the District Court
rule in your favor.
69 See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1578 (reversing the District Court's claim construction); Amtel
Corp., 198 F.3d 1374 (reversing the District Court's holding that the claim was invalid for
indefiniteness because the District Court improperly construed the means-plus-function limitation).
70 See Michel, supra note 26, at 1191 (arguing that if parties cannot predict the outcome they
will be less likely to settle early).
71 Soo RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 88-90 (Harvard

University Press, 1996) (explaining the mathematics behind deciding to sue someone). Three
variables allow a party to determine whether to settle: P - the probability of winning, J - the
judgment value, and C - the cost of litigation. Id. When P times J is greater then C it makes sense
to pursue litigation. Id. Unfortunately, inabilities by parties to accurately predict P tends to cause
parties to overestimate P times J and thus sue when C will substantially outweigh any benefit. Id.
at 90. It has been argued that this equation is incomplete when talking about patent cases because
there is a possibility that the entire patent will be lost.
See Gwendolyn Dawson, Note,
Matchmaking in the Realm of Patents:A Call for the Marriageof Theory and Claim Construction
Procedure,79 TEX. L.REV. 1257, n. 125 (2001) (arguing that the issue of patent validity changes the
calculus of determining whether to sue). One could argue, however, that a properly determined C
(based on the work of knowledgeable counsel) would include the actual cost of litigation, the loss of
good will and any other consequential damages such as the loss of the patent. In addition, the value
of a patent is only realized through the right to exclude. In some cases, losing an infringement case
can be the equivalent of not having a patent at all and the costs relating to the loss of a patent may
be trivial.
72 See Michele Galen, Guilty!, BUS. WK., Apr. 13, 1992, at 60, 64 (arguing that almost 80% of
the cost incurred happen during discovery). Assuming that courts and parties would be reluctant to
construe claims before discovery is complete, the additional expense of going to trial is probably not
enough of a deterrent to cause both parties to settle because the discovery costs are sunk.
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more deference to the trial judge's claim construction.7 3 Interlocutory appeal has also
been suggested as a means of solving the problem.' 4 Alternative Dispute Resolution
("ADR") has also been recommend as a solution to claim construction.7 5 Finally, it
76
has been suggested that a panel of experts in the art resolve claim construction.
While each of these methods has certain advantages, this comment will show that
each method falls short in meeting the current needs of the patent system and an
alternative is needed if the patent system is going to effectively meet business
77
requirements.

ANALYSIS OF METHODS
In this section some criteria are developed for examining proposed solutions to
claim construction. The criteria are then used to compare the current and proposed
solutions to claim construction. The results show how different methods of claim
construction further the policies behind patent law.

A. The Criteria Of Comparison
In order to propose an alternative to the current method of claim construction, it
helps to look objectively at the existing method and compare it to possible
alternatives.7 8 This requires some objective criteria so that each alternative can
73 See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 147778 (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that CAFC should be
more deferential to District Court's claim construction). A single en banc decision could modify the
de novo standard into a clear error standard.
74 Cf Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1479 (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting that, despite the
attempts of District Courts to get interlocutory appeal of claim construction, not once has the
Federal Circuit granted certification).
75 See Scott H. Blackmand, Rebecca M. McNeill, Alternative Dispute Resolution in
Commercial IntellectualProperty Disputes, 47 Am. U.L. REV. 1709 (1998) (arguing that ADR often
has significant advantages compared to litigation when parties are faced with an intellectual
property dispute).
76 See Craig Allen Nard, Legitimacy and the Useful Arts, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 515 (1997)
(arguing that the PTO should be used to interpret claims); John F. Duffy, Patent Law and Policy
Symposium." RE-EngineeringPatent Law." The Challenge of Technologies: Part 1."Administrative
Law Issues.*On Improving The Legal Process Of Claim Interpretation:Administrative Alternatives,
2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 109 (2000) (arguing that patent claims could be construed more efficiently
by an administrative body); Gregg A. Paradise, Note, Arbitration of Patent Infringement Disputes.*
Encouraging the Use of Arbitration Through Evidence Rules Reform, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 247
(1995) (arguing that one of the advantages of arbitration is that the arbitrators can be
knowledgeable in subject matter).
77 See Gwendolyn Dawson, supra note 71, at 1258 (arguing that the procedure used to protect
patents is no longer properly aligned with the theory behind patents). This point is accepted as true
for the purposes of this paper, indeed there would be little reason to suggest change if the patent
system was working correctly. Cf Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1476 (Rader, J., dissenting) (citing
C VI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146 (Fed. Cir. 1997), where the CAFC reversed its
own previous claim construction). It is hard to argue that the system is working properly when
faced with even a single case such as this.
78 See Duffy, supra note 76, at 111 (looking at patent law as if it were a technology and
examining it as a technician looking for innovation would analyze an existing technology).
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fairly be compared. Ideally, the criteria should be derived from our system of patent
9
protection and be related to the policy behind patents.'
This comment will look at following factors: ease of implementation or
compatibility with current system80 , efficiency for individual cases81 , quality and
consistency in the outcome8 2, and general patent policy implications.8 3 Because this
comment is looking at the issue of whether a better methodology exists, the legal
fiction that claim construction is purely a question of law will be ignored.8 4 For this
comment, each factor will be weighted equally with the realization that a more
perfectly designed weighting system would probably not ascribe equal weight to each
85
factor.

79 Cf Markman, 517 U.S. at 388 (holding that functional considerations should be used to
determine what history and precedent could not answer).
80 See Duffy, supra note 76, at 113 (drawing an analogy between technology and legal methods
and suggesting that practicality does matter). As a practical matter, a sweeping change is not
desired because it is more difficult to overcome the inertia that naturally resists change. In
addition, large changes have a tendency to bring about unexpected results and businesses do not
need additional uncertainty to complicate the decision making process.
81 C. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. I1 (1942) (holding that an even an individual farmer is
important in the national scope of the wheat industry). If one wheat farmer is important, then
surely an individual patent is important. In addition, inefficiency in a case raises the transactional
costs of the parties involved and, therefore, is contrary to the basic patent policy of encouraging
innovation. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
82 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 (noting that the CAFC was created by Congress to increase
the uniformity of decisions regarding patent law because such uniformity would "foster technological
growth and industrial innovation"). While complete uniformity is impossible because of the different
ways to frame a particular issue, increasing the current level of predictability will help promote the
needs of businesses.
83 See Dawson, supra note 71, at 1259-60 (arguing that patent law should be designed so as to
promote the balance between the incentive to invent and the limit on those incentives); see also
Markman, 317 U.S. at 390 (explaining the reasons for why a patent grant needs to be clearly
known); Duffy, supra note 76, at I1 (arguing that patent law should be studied as a technology
with the intent to advance or improve the technology). It is probably fair to say that a patent system
that fails to promote innovation has little value because the patent system was created for the
purpose of promoting innovation. Cf Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850). The
Supreme Court affirmed a holding that a patent was invalid:
unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank
and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob
than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there
was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential
elements of every invention.
Id.
84 See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1473 (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that claim construction
was held to be a pure legal question to avoid the strictures of the Seventh Amendment); c.f Lucas
Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Industries, L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329,333, n. 7 (D. Del. 1995) (arguing that
the CAFC "knowingly enters a land of sophistry and fiction" when it tells the District Court to
ignore credibility of a party in the legal determination of a claim construction). As the Seventh
Amendment only preserves the right to jury trial and the Supreme Court in Markman held there
was no right to a jury trial for claim construction it is not necessary for the claim construction to be
a pure legal issue. Markman, 517 U.S. at 384.
85 It is outside the scope of this comment to develop a weighting system that accurately
depicts the importance of each factor to the United States economy and the legal system.
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B. Methods Of Claim Construction
After developing the criteria for looking at claim construction methods, the next
step is to apply the criteria. The order of comparison will start first with the existing
method of claim construction and then look at possibilities that propose increasing
levels of change. This sorting is based on the assumption that change, while needed,
86
should be minimal to avoid unintended consequences where possible.

1. The CurrentMethod of Claim Construction
The current method of claim construction involves the District Court judge
construing the patent claims. 87 Then, either party can appeal the claim construction
to the CAFC which will construe the claims without deference to the District Court's
claim construction.88 After the equivalent of a second trial on the issue of claim
construction, the parties, depending on the record, may either be told to retry the
issue of infringement8 9 or be told the outcome of the case based on CAFC's revision of
the claim construction.9 0
The logical advantages are that this method should give consistent and high
quality results because 1) the same 12 judges decide all patent claims, thus tending
to minimize disagreements in claim construction, 91 and 2) these 12 judges regularly
review claim construction and will develop a certain level of expertise because of
their familiarity with patent claim construction issues.9 2 In addition, compatibility
with the current system is not an issue.
The disadvantage of the current method is its inefficiency for an individual case
because the decision regarding claim construction is not final until the end of the

86 Cf Duffy, supra note 76, at 112 (arguing that it makes sense to target a discrete problem
because most innovation are the culmination of many small improvements).
87 Markman, 517 U.S. at 391.
88 Cybor Colp, 138 F.3d at 1451.
89 See Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1578 (modifying the District Court's claim construction and
remanding for further proceedings); see alsoAmtel Corp., 198 F.3d 1374 (holding that District Court
erred in the claim construction and remanding the case for further proceeding). In Amtol Corp., the
District Court granted summary judgment because the patent claim was indefinite but the holding
rested on the finding that a means-plus-function limitation lacked sufficient disclosure and the lack
of disclosure finding rested in the claim construction. 198 F.3d at 1375-78.
90 See Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1561-62 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(reversing the District Court's claim construction and holding that Lubrizol, based on the new claim
construction, did not infringe as a matter of law). This holding effectively ended the case without
giving Exxon a chance to argue the matter based on the new claim construction. Id.
91 See Michel, supra note 26, at 1191 (arguing that in 90% of the cases the results would be
same regardless of whom composed the panel). This is similar to the statistic that 90% of the cases
are unanimous. Id. Judge Michel's estimate could be based on the fact that it would take two
judges to disagree with the outcome in order for the case to come out differently. The fact that three
judges are deciding the claim construction is an added benefit. If only one judge were doing the
claim construction, you could expect a higher level of unpredictability simply because the probability
of an individual judge disagreeing is higher than the probability of having two judges disagree.
92 Soo Michel, supra note 26, at 1181 (noting that CAFC current had 374 patent cases pending
in 1998 compared to about 250 cases in the early 1990's).
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appeals process. 93 In addition, the current method does not support the policy
requirement laid out in Markman I because there is a great deal of uncertainty in
how a particular claim construction issue will turn out.94 The lack of factual findings
in a pure legal issue makes it difficult for either party to predict the end result. 95 The
lack of deference given to the trial court tends to make each party look ahead to a
possible appeal to the CAFC when arguing their preferred claim construction to the
District Court judge. 96 It is fair to say that the current method leaves something to
97
be desired.

C Existing Proposalsfor Improving the Predictabilityof Claim Construction
The following proposals have been suggested as possible methods for improving
the methodology of the courts when it comes to claim construction. Each alternative
will be analyzed separately, first looking at the positive aspects and then looking at
the negative aspects.

1. GrantingMore Deference To The DistrictCourt Judge'sDecision
One of the most obvious solutions to claim construction unpredictability is for
the CAFC to give more deference to the District Court's claim construction.9 8 The
actual amount of deference that would be most advantageous is debatable. 99
However, any increased level of deference would tend to have some stabilizing effect
on the claim construction issue. 100
93 See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1476 (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that the current method
does not provide finality until every step of federal litigation is complete (with the exception of an
appeal to the Supreme Court), and that naturally there is finality once all the appeals in litigation
process are exhausted).
94 See Michel, supra note 26, at 1191 (arguing that complaints about panel dependency are
probably more accurately directed towards the lack of predictability and admitting that if seasoned
practitioners cannot predict the outcome there is a problem).
95 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW, 1 (1949) (arguing that experience,
not logic, has been the driving force in the law). In a legal world, logic is often not enough because
both sides may be logically right. In such a case, the facts are what make the difference.
96 See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1476 (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that the trial court's
claim interpretation is just the start). Judge Newman also addressed the issue and noted that the
de novo appeal has released the appellant's imagination and added a sporting element to the
process. Id. at 1479.
97 See generally Luke L. Dauchet, The Federal Circuit's De novo Review of Patent Claim
Construetion:A Need For a More BalancedApp-roaeh, 18 No. 1 INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL. 1 (1999).
98 See Duffy, supra note 76, at 121-24 (arguing that giving more deference to the trial court
ruling on questions of mixed fact and law might be a better approach to how we address the claim
construction issue).
99 See Dauchet, supra note 97, at 7 (arguing that factual findings relating to claim
construction should only be reversed for clear error but that legal conclusions should be reviewed de
novo); Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1473-76 (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that de novo review is hard
to justify because claim construction is a mixture of fact and law and that, therefore, some deference
should be given to District Court judges).
100 See Chu, supra note 3, 1113-14 (showing that statistically, different types of judgment
with different levels of review do have different reversal rates). Logically, any other outcome would
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The advantages of granting increased deference to a District Court's claim
construction are straightforward. Such a change would be easy to implement and is
compatible with our current legal system. A single decision by the CAFC or Congress
is all that is need to change the level of deference. 10 1 In addition, there are other
areas where the District Courts are given greater deference in a mixed facts and law
1 02
issue.
The impact on efficiency would be less clear. There would be an obvious gain in
efficiency in any given case due to the decreased likelihood that the District Court
decision would be overturned.10 3 The overall efficiency of the patent system might
not improve, however, because possible variations in how different District Courts
and different District Court judges construe patent claims could lead to forum
04
shopping.
When analyzing the affect of increasing the deference given to District Court
judges, it is difficult to predict effect on the quality or consistency of outcome. Given
the current high rate of reversals, 10 5 one could argue that allowing an increased
deference, with the goal of decreasing the number of reversals, would be simply
masking the problem. If we assumed that claim construction is being reversed
because the District Court was incorrect, then quality or consistency would not be
improved by granting the District Court's decision greater deference. In addition, the
underlying policy behind the Markman decision would not be supported.10 6 Granting
increased deference, without more, would simply make the inconsistent outcomes
more stable.

not make sense because as the level of deference goes up it becomes more difficult for the CAFC to
reverse.

101 Cf Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1451 (holding en bane that claim construction is a matter of
law to be review de novo); see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoko Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234
F.3d 558, 574-75 (Fed.Cir. 2000), vaoated and remanded by 122 S.Ct. 1831 (2002) (holding that
CAFC would, based on the experience of 20 years, would reverse previous case law and hold that
any amendment for reasons of patentability acted as a complete bar for the purposes of the doctrine

of equivalents).
102 See, e.g., Cooter & Cell v. Hartmarx Corp., 469 U.S. 384 (1990) (holding that
determinations of legal sufficiency for Rule 11 sanctions were to be review for abuse of discretion
and noting the difficulty of determining the difference between law and fact). This author believes
that a rational argument could be made to support the proposition that the legal sufficiency of a
complaint is a legal question.

103 See Cybor Cozp., 138 F.3d at 1478 (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that increased deference
will increase certainty and move patent law towards earlier settlements).
104 Cf Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 (holding that Congress created the CAFC to increase
uniformity in the United States' patent system).
Reviewing District Court decision on claim
construction for clear error might not provide the certainty and uniformity that Congress intended
because if there are two plausible outcomes the claim construction could not be clear error. See
goenerallyAnderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)
105 See Chu, supra note 3, at 1103-07 (showing that CAFC modified claim construction about
44% of the time and reversed cases based on claim construction 30% of the time).
106 C
Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-90 (applying functional analysis and determining that
juries should not construe claims because the purpose of a patent is to encourage innovation).
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2. GrantingInterlocutoryAppeals To Review Claim Construction
Another possible method for improving the existing method of construing claims
is to have the CAFC grant interlocutory appeals after the trial judge construes the
claims. 1 0 7 Because the claims are construed de novo on appeal, it initially appears to
make sense to have an earlier determination of how the CAFC will construe the
claims. Given the CAFC preference for intrinsic evidence 10 8, an interlocutory appeal
seems well suited to resolve the problem of claim construction. 10 9
The benefits of interlocutory appeal are readily apparent. Each case could be
resolved with increased efficiency because it would no longer be necessary for the
parties to wait until the completion of the trial to determine what often is the
dispositive issue in the case. 110 Earlier resolution would also serve to promote the
policies behind the Markman decision;1 1 an earlier decision would reduce the cost
112
and better allow inventors to go about the business of selling the invention.
The problem is that interlocutory appeal may have a negative effect on the
quality and consistency of claim construction. The CAFC has stated that a fully
developed record aids in the proper construction of claims so earlier review by the
CAFC might well lead to less consistent and lower quality decisions. 113 On one hand,
interlocutory appeal appears to be straightforward to implement because the federal
rules already give the circuit court the discretion to grant the appeals. 114 The ease of
implementation is misleading, however, because the CAFC is not currently suited to
handling a significant increase in appeals. 115
Given the real possibility of a
107 See Craig Allen Nard, Intelleetual Property Challenges In The Next Century: Process
Considerationsin the Age ofMarkman and Mantras,2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 355 (arguing that CAFC
cannot both review claim construction de novo on appeal and not grant interlocutory appeals).
Professor Nard argues that one way to fix the issue is to make Markman decisions appealable as a
matter of right. Id. at 377.
108 See Vitronies, 90 F.3d at 1583 (holding that in most situations intrinsic evidence by itself
will resolve the ambiguity in a patent claim); but see Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182
F.3d 1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that it is appropriate for a court to consider extrinsic
evidence to make sure the patent file does not indicate a meaning 'inconsistent with clearly
expressed, plainly apposite, and widely held understandings in the pertinent technical field").
109 See Nard, supra note 107, at 355 (arguing that interlocutory appeals would foster earlier
settlements and promote certainty).
110 I-d.
111 Id.
112 TM Patents, L.P. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d. 370, 377 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(discussing how grants of interlocutory appeals after Markman hearings would save millions of
dollars and promote earlier settlement).
113 See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1479 (Newman, J., additional views) (discussing how the
unwillingness of CAFC to grant interlocutory appeals was because often the record was not
adequate prior to the completion of the trial).
114 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994) (allowing a circuit court the discretion to grant an appeal if
the District Court certifies the interlocutory order).
115 See Nard, supra note 107, at 376 (arguing that interlocutory appeal will solve the
problems with claim construction but admitting that the CAFC's caseload would increase with the
granting of interlocutory appeals); Michel, supra note 26, at 1181 (discussing increase in caseload
that CAFC has experienced as the number of patent cases have increased and arguing that the
CAFC is operating at near capacity). There is little doubt that the cost of discovery is significant.
Galen, supra note 72, at 64. If one assumes that the CAFC would grant interlocutory appeals after
a Markman hearing, it is reasonable to predict, based on the sunk cost of discovery needed to get to
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dramatically increased caseload, 116 the inevitable delays would probably negate any
117
efficiency gains that might otherwise be obtained.

3. UsingAlternative Dispute Resolution To Settle The Dispute
Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") is an important method for resolving
patent issues and is currently used with great success in a majority of the patent
cases. 118 Given the cost of a trial1 19, only the close cases should make it to trial 120 and
in a close case ADR is unlikely to resolve the dispute. 121 It is also unlikely the ADR
can solve cases where neither party is willing to settle. 122 Therefore, while ADR
certainly has an important place in the modern justice system, it is unlikely that
123
ADR can provide the solution to claim construction.

a Markman hearing, a significant number of litigants would be interested in getting a second
opinion. If one remembers Judge Prosser's formula of probability times expected value versus
litigation cost, an appeal of the claim construction becomes an obvious choice for any valuable
patent.
116 Cf Galen, supra note 72, at 64 (arguing 80% of costs are spent during discovery). If one
assumes that discovery is needed before the Markman hearing then there is significant incentive to
appeal the claim construction just to see if the CAFC agrees with the District Court.
117 See Michel, supra note 26, at 1181 (arguing that even a slight increase in the caseload
could erode the speed with which cases are handled and possible harm the quality of decisions). If
Judge Michel is correct, the cure of interlocutory appeals might well be worse then the disease of
uncertain claim construction.
118 See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases:Does Geographic Choice Affect
Innovation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 913 (2001) (showing that 76% of patent cases were resolved via
settlement). Of the cases that settled, 34% were settled before any court action and 51% were
settled during the litigation. Id. The remaining 15% were disposed of after the pre-trial conference.
Id.
119 See supratext accompanying note 28.
120 See POSNER, supra note 71, at 88-90 (discussing when a party should consider litigation).
Only if the probability of winning a case multiplied by the value of a winning judgment exceeds the
cost of litigation should one consider litigation. [d.; sn a o Moore, supra note 118, at 913 (arguing
that settlement is more likely to occur early in the process before the parties have invested
significant resources in preparing for litigation).
121 See POSNER, supra note 71, at 88-90 (showing that if the uncertainty is high a person is
more likely to litigate). For valuable patents it will probably make sense to litigate. For example, if
the probability of the outcome is 50/50 and the value of the patent is twenty million dollars one can
see that the excepted value of litigation is ten million dollars. Litigation, even at a cost of even two
and one half million dollars, makes sense because the expected value is seven and one half million
dollars. Unless a settlement can offer both parties more then seven and one half million there is
little reason settle.
122 See Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., Using Alternative Dispute Resolution to Resolve Patent
Litigation:A Survey of Patent Litigators,3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 77, 87 (arguing that ADR
is being increasingly used but admitting that when the stakes are high enough neither party is
likely to settle).
123 Id. at 81 (arguing that ADR and mediation in particular is responsible for the constant
level of patent cases reaching trial despite the fact that there has been an increase in the number of
patent suits filed). Just because the number of cases being settled by ADR has increased does not
mean the issue is solved because the number of patent cases that the CAFC sees has increased.
Michel, supra note 26, at 1181. It is likely that the increased use of ADR reflects the increasing cost
of litigation. Only for highly valuable patents is litigation reasonable. In many cases it probably
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4. UsingA Panel OfExperts To Construe The Claims
One of the best ways to construe claims, from a theoretical standpoint, is
through the use of a panel of people having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA).124
For example, a panel of arbitrators could construe the patent claims and the panel's
decision would be given the usual deference that arbitration decisions are due. 125 A
possible method of using arbitration would be to use neutral patent attorneys in
panels of three to construe claims. The patent attorneys would be required to be
PHOSITA and they would use the Federal Rules of Evidence during the
arbitration.126
This method would provide quick resolution1 27 , high quality and consistency of
outcome,1 28 and would be ideally suited towards implementing the policy that
1 29
Markman I indicated should be considered when designing a patent system.
Although arbitration in some form is the obvious answer to claim construction, there
is one significant problem that prevents arbitration from being the ideal solution, at
least in the short term.
To implement binding arbitration of patent claims, or any other panel of expert
method for that matter, requires a modification of existing statutory framework and
the creation of a special set of rules for patent arbitration.1 30 The delays and
difficulties likely to be encountered in such a change are not trivial. 13 1 Therefore,

makes sense to license the patent rather than spend several million dollars on litigation and,
therefore, the parties settle.
124 See Paradise, supra note 76, at 248-49 (arguing that parties should resolve patent disputes
by using binding arbitration with modified Federal Rules of Evidence because arbitration is cheaper
and faster then litigation).
125 Cf Nard, supra note 76, at 515 (arguing that the PTO should be used to resolve claims
validity because the PTO is better suited institutionally to comprehend the patent claims).
Naturally, this same argument could also apply to an appropriate panel of arbitrators because, if
they were skilled in the necessary art, than the panel would also be better suited to understand the
claims.
126 See Nard, supra note 76, at 521 (arguing that PTO is best suited to comprehend the metes
and bounds of a patent claim). The author of this comment suggests that while the PTO might
understand the patent claim, to avoid any possible bias it would probably be better to have neutral
patent attorneys construe claims. This would also avoid any problems with diverting the PTO from
their primary task of granting patents.
127 See Paradise, supra note 76, at 248 (noting that one of the many advantages arbitration
has in speed). Logically, if the arbitrators were a person having ordinary skill in the art
("PHOSITA"), then they could often eliminate the need for extrinsic evidence and rapidly come to a
decision.
128 Id. If the arbitrators were a PHOSITA, then they could consistently make the correct
decision because of their knowledge in the technology.
129 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-90 (noting judges would be better than juries at
interpreting claims and therefore using judges to construe claims would promote uniformity).
Extending the Supreme Court's logic, patent attorneys would be better then judges at construing
claims because they are both familiar with claim construction and also understand the technology.
Therefore, using patent attorney would promote even greater uniformity.
130 C. Festo, 234 F.3d at 57475 (holding that flexible bar approach will no longer be used
based on nearly twenty years of experience). The fact that the CAFC took twenty years to make this
decision speaks volumes for how difficult it is to make changes to the current legal system.
131 See Michel, supra note 26, at 1182 (noting that while Congress has experimented once by
creating a CAFC to be responsible for patent appeals, it has not been eager to try additional

[2:138 2002]

A Practical Solution to Claim Construction

while such a change would help move the patent system forward and make it more
responsive to increasingly complex technologies 3 2, the prospects of this type of
reform are not high.

D. The Impact of the Analysis
Four different proposed solutions to claim construction have been analyzed and
compared to the existing method of claim construction. The current method of claim
construction is logically flawed because the initial trial only serves as a warm-up for
arguing claim construction in the CAFC.
The first three solutions, increase
deference, interlocutory appeals and ADR, all have certain advantages but also have
significant disadvantages that make each of these solutions unlikely to solve the
problem. The fourth possible solution, panels of experts, would solve the problem on
a policy level but is such a departure from current practices that it is likely to be
difficult to implement. 133 Therefore, something else is needed.

A PROPOSAL FOR RESOLVING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION UNCERTAINTY

Earlier in this comment, the analysis found that merely granting increased
deference to the trial judge's claim construction did not solve the issue of uncertain
claim construction. Various writers have proposed a slightly more complicated
granting of increased deference that might work, 13 4 however, and this comment will
expound on this more complex solution. 13 5 One of the major problems with the
current method is the legal fiction that claim construction is a purely a matter of law;
this legal fiction prevents consistency in claim construction. This comment therefore
proposes that three factors should be determined by the District Court as findings of
fact.

experiments). Judge Michel admits that dramatic changes may be required to solve to overly slow
and expensive civil process we current have. Id. at 1203.
132 Cf Nard, supra note 76, at 521 (explaining how persons skilled in the technology are
better suited to properly determining the modalities of technical language).
133 See Duffy, supra note 76, at 113 (arguing that practicality is important when proposing a
solution to existing legal problems).
134 See, e.g., Matthew R. Hulse, Article: _. Intellectual Property: B. Patent: 1. Claim
Construction:a) Standardof Review. Cybor Corp v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
87 (1999).
135 While many authors and some of the CAFC judges have argued that there are facts to be
determined, little has been said about which facts should be granted additional deference. See
Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1477-78 (Rader, J., dissenting) (listing facts that District Court judges
consider during claim construction and suggesting additional deference should be given to the
decision).
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The Points OfFact That Should Be DeterminedBy The District CourtJudge

Only a few of the many factors that go into construing a claim actually need to
137
be matters of fact. 13 6 The first factor is what a PHOSITA is for the given patent.
The second factor is the plain meaning of the claim. 138 The third factor is what
problem the patent is solving. 139 Once the PHOSITA, the plain meaning of the claim,
and the problem are identified the District Court can then decide the legal question
of claim construction based on a fundamental understanding. Granting deference to
these three factors should make it possible to increase the consistency and the
quality of claim construction by the District Court while preserving the ability of the
CAFC to ensure that patent law remains uniform.

B.

The Reasons Why District CourtJudges Should Determine These Factors

There are two basic assumptions behind these three factors.
The first
assumption is that the CAFC was not implemented to decide facts. 140 In general,
courts of appeal are never to be courts of first instance. 141 The purpose of a court of
appeal is to review how the law was applied to the facts. 142 A well functioning court
of appeals should apply the law to a given set of facts in a clear manner so that
143
District Courts can correctly apply the same law to other sets of similar facts.
The second assumption is that anything that needs to be determined in light of
extrinsic evidence should be determined by the District Court. This is because
extrinsic evidence is used to determine facts. Facts, in turn, are used to arrive at a
136 Cf Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, (1966) (holding that the legal conclusion of
obviousness would be determined based on findings of facts). While this comment is proposing three
factors, it is possible that additional factors should be considered and that different weight should be
given to each factor. Such an evolution is to be expected and desired.
137 While the holding in Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1454, appeared to make extrinsic evidence
and the need to consider a PHOSITA unnecessary, the CAFC has recently shifted to a more
reasonable approach regarding the perspective of one skilled in the art. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v.
Hewlett-Paekard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that it is appropriate for a
District Court to consider extrinsic evidence to ensure the claim construction is in agreement with
what one skilled in the art would understand the claim to mean).
138 Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1309. Given that most District Court judges will not be experts
in the relevant patent art, it is expected and probably required for a judge to consider extrinsic
evidence when determining the literal meaning of the claims. Id.
139 The European Patent Office analyzes patents based on the technical problem. See
generally Biogen, Inc., O.J. E.P.O. T207/94 273, 281 (1997) (defining the technical problem before
holding that prior art suggested the solution to the problem). The author of this comment believes
this is because trying to discern the boundaries of an invention without understanding what
problem the inventor was trying to solve is a difficult task indeed for someone not skilled in the art.
As an analogy, an answer does not make much sense unless there is a question.
140 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 390-91 (noting that CAFC was created to provide uniformity
and foster technological growth). While the CAFC was created to unify the legal differences of the
various circuits there is little support for the argument that the CAFC was designed to making
findings of fact.
141 "[F]act finding is the basic responsibility of District Courts, rather than appellate
courts.... DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 450 (1974) (citing note).
142 Id.
143 Id.
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legal conclusion. Using extrinsic evidence to make a legal conclusion necessarily
ignores and/or obscures the facts that must be used to determine the legal conclusion.
Obscuring the facts used in a legal conclusion makes it extremely difficult to develop
a pattern that enables our legal system to work efficiently.144

1. How The FactorsAre Determined
It is evident that the first factor, what a PHOSITA is, requires extrinsic evidence
for determination. A PHOSITA is not made clear by the patent claims. 145 The
introduction and the written description provide some help but more is needed. The
District Court must look at the ordinary skill of a person in relevant industry. This
typically requires expert testimony or at least some sort of understanding of the
relevant industry.
The second factor, the plain meaning of the claim, also requires extrinsic
evidence to be determined. The claims themselves are not sufficient to determine the
146
A "four corners" 147
plain meaning because words are defined by how they are used.
rule can only make sense if the person interpreting the document is a PHOSITA.
The word "anchor" might mean one thing to a sailor and another thing to a structural
engineer. The District Court judge will normally need to use technical dictionaries,
textbooks or expert witnesses to determine how the words would normally be
understood by a PHOSITA.
The third factor, the purpose of the invention, also requires extrinsic evidence.
Correct claim construction requires understanding what problem the inventor sought
to solve. 148 Logically, understanding a solution to the problem requires knowing the
problem. The only way to ensure an accurate understanding of the problem is to look
at state of the art at the time of the invention. 149 Therefore, the District Court judge
needs some extrinsic evidence.

2.

Applying The Objective Criteria To The Proposed Claim ConstructionMethod

The proposed claim construction method allows the District Court to make three
findings of fact. Then, the District Court makes the various conclusions of law. This
proposed procedure allows the CAFC to review the legal conclusions de novo and the
factual findings for clear error.

144 Soo supratext accompanying note 95.

145 PitneyBowes, 182 F.3d at 1309.
146 Id.
147 Soo CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL.,

PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW (4th ed. 1999) 458-94

(discussing parol evidence, the "four corners" rule and the modern trend allowing extrinsic evidence
to supplement a writing and noting that extrinsic evidence has always been used to explain the
written document). One could easily argue that if a contract often requires extrinsic evidence to be

explained, than it is even more probable that a patent will require extrinsic evidence to be
explained.
148 Biogen, Inc., O.J. E.P.O. T207/94 at 281.
149 PitneyBowes, 182 F.3d at 1309.
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There are three advantages to this revised method of claim construction. First,
it is easy to implement such a change. The federal circuit needs only a single en banc
holding to implement the revised procedure. In addition, the holding in Markman H
made it clear that the Supreme Court felt that claim construction was a mixed
150
question of facts and law so there is no barrier to making such a change.
Second, the efficiency of individual cases would be improved. The superior
ability of the District Court to make factual findings would be used. This would
allow the CAFC to focus on the application of law to the facts rather than on the facts
and speed up the appeal process.
Third, the consistency and quality of a particular decision would be improved.
The District Courts would determine facts, thus taking advantage of the expertise of
our District Courts. The three factors would allow the District Courts to better
perceive a pattern regarding how the law should be applied. In addition, the CAFC
could review the legal analysis to ensure that the law is correctly applied.
Finally, anything that increases the predictability of patent law while
maintaining strong patent support aids the general policy behind patents. 15 1 As case
law creates patterns it becomes possible for lawyers to better predict the outcome and
provide better assistance to their clients. 152 Arguably, the policies that led the
Supreme Court to the decision in Markman I]will only be realized when the system
153
is designed as the Court suggested.

CONCLUSION

This comment started with the policies that support patents. Based on these
policies, criteria were developed to analyze methods of claim construction. These
criteria were then applied to the current method and several suggested methods of
claim construction. The results suggested that the methods analyzed fail to solve the
claim construction problem.
Therefore, a modified method of increased deference was suggested to improve
the patent system's ability to meet the needs of business. This modified method
would have the District Court determine three factors as matters of fact and these
factors would help provide a basis for understanding patent claims at the District
Court level. This proposal takes advantage of the abilities of both the district and
appeals court and should improve predictability and efficiency, thus better
supporting the needs of business while promoting the policies underlying the United
States patent system.

150 Markman, 517 U.S. at 38889.
151 Soo Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 (holding that the limits of the patent must be known to
avoid creating a zone of uncertainty surrounding the patents claims).
152 It will probably never be possible to predict infringement with certainty because of the
numerous legal traps in claim construction. It is possible, however, to improve the current system
so as to remove some of the uncertainty.
153 Soo Ma-rkman, 517 U.S. at 388-89 (holding that claim construction is a mixture of fact and
law); soo also Cybor Carp, 138 F.3d at 1473-75 (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing the trial should be
the main event and that de novo review will potentially undercut the benefits of Markman I).
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